Mediterranean 2030 : for a common vision of the future
In April 2009, IPEMED has undertaken, in partnership with specialised Euro-Mediterranean organisations (CARIM, CIHEAM, FEMISE, OME) an extensive foresight project whose aim is to rally, within the “Mediterranean 2030” consortium, institutional and private-sector foresight bodies in the Mediterranean basin to the task of building a common vision of the Mediterranean in 2030.
The project has a scientific and economic objective: to elaborate joint, region-wide diagnostics and projections in the fields of energy, agriculture, water, environment, population and migration. But more importantly, a political and pedagogical objective : to foster and encourage long-term cooperation between officials responsible for foresight, to disseminate foresight methodology throughout the Mediterranean region and to be a tool for decision making.
Today, the “Mediterranean 2030” consortium regularly gathers more than 30 institutions from 15 different countries of the Mediterranean basin.
Drawing up a shared vision of the Mediterranean and maping out possible futures
At the time of the Arabic revolutions and of the crisis of the Euro zone, the Mediterranean is facing great uncertainty regarding its future, on the rhythm of anticipated evolutions, on the role of regional integration and on the political voluntarism to face it. However, a rich web of economic, institutional and human relations is constantly being woven, inviting us to ask ourselves questions about its future.
Structurally, the Mediterranean integration is highly varied, depending on the country or sub-region concerned. The Mediterranean region is thus heterogeneous but in the process of integrating, and this makes it a focus of both political and economic investment. The motivations behind this investment are as many and varied as the challenges, countries and people that make up the region: economic,... ![]()
Drawing up a shared vision of the Mediterranean and maping out possible futures
At the time of the Arabic revolutions and of the crisis of the Euro zone, the Mediterranean is facing great uncertainty regarding its future, on the rhythm of anticipated evolutions, on the role of regional integration and on the political voluntarism to face it. However, a rich web of economic, institutional and human relations is constantly being woven, inviting us to ask ourselves questions about its future.
Structurally, the Mediterranean integration is highly varied, depending on the country or sub-region concerned. The Mediterranean region is thus heterogeneous but in the process of integrating, and this makes it a focus of both political and economic investment. The motivations behind this investment are as many and varied as the challenges, countries and people that make up the region: economic, political, civic, social, environmental, cultural and so forth. But these initiatives all tend to weave closer what history has done and undone, to accelerate the income dynamics in the region and to speed up its global ranking as compared to world economic giants.
Nevertheless, until now, the Mediterranean has not been thought as an entity and there is hardly a global vision of what its future may be. Although many Mediterranean countries have put together national foresight visions (Morocco 2030, Tunisia 2030, Mauritania Vision 2030, France 2025, Egypt 2025, Spain’s territorial foresight vision, Greece’s strategic planning, Jordan Vision 2020, etc.), these exercises are understandably focused on the countries’ own future prospects. The regional aspect is considered in the sense of each country’s immediate neighbours (the Maghreb in the case of Morocco 2030, for example, Europe in France 2025). Consequently, the Mediterranean is rarely taken into consideration at all, let alone as a coherent regional bloc. Hence a foresight on what the region as a whole, if more deeply integrated, could and should become seems necessary in order to imagine a common future. The common vision should verify whether major trends and events marking breaks with the past will lead to greater convergence or greater divergence. The vision must, above all, be shared by all of the countries that together “are” the Mediterranean and it should include input from experts from the countries in question. It should also be multi-disciplinary, so as to ensure global coverage of all challenges in all areas and the systemic interactions between them, and also so as to promote cross-fertilization between disciplines.
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After two years of common reflection, the members of the consortium have jointly identified obvious synergies (collective preferences, demographic, natural resources but also in the production of goods and services) and challenges to which countries cannot respond individually (shortfall of adapted jobs, climate change and preservation of natural resources, food crises, migrations). Then, several scenarios have been drawn up at the horizon of 2030.
The future of the region is facing several threats. A disparate insertion of the countries of the region in the world economy producing an accentuation of divergences between economies (scenario of “Mediterranean divergences”) or a scenario darken by the 2008 financial crisis, leading to bottom-up convergence and the marginalization of Mediterranean countries weaken by the sovereign debt’s crisis, in the North, and a political transition... ![]()
After two years of common reflection, the members of the consortium have jointly identified obvious synergies (collective preferences, demographic, natural resources but also in the production of goods and services) and challenges to which countries cannot respond individually (shortfall of adapted jobs, climate change and preservation of natural resources, food crises, migrations). Then, several scenarios have been drawn up at the horizon of 2030.
The future of the region is facing several threats. A disparate insertion of the countries of the region in the world economy producing an accentuation of divergences between economies (scenario of “Mediterranean divergences”) or a scenario darken by the 2008 financial crisis, leading to bottom-up convergence and the marginalization of Mediterranean countries weaken by the sovereign debt’s crisis, in the North, and a political transition struck, in the South (scenario of the “crisis in the Mediterranean”), are both plausible and unfavourable for regional integration.
Yet, another future is possible, the one drawn by the “Mediterranean convergence” scenario. Hinged on pro-active political action shared by all countries, Mediterranean convergence, coupled with a stronger and richer economic growth in terms of employment, could be envisaged. For this to happen, it is necessary to encourage a geographic redistribution of the production, sharing the added value, promoting complementarities, a greater redistribution of wealth and the harmonisation of norms in a regionally integrated system that benefits from the four freedoms implemented by the EU (movement of goods, capital, services and people).
The convergence scenario could be driven by an endogenous growth of North Africa and the Middle East and not by a more marked European will. This economic dynamics in the South could take two different forms. It could have a domino effect on Member States’ economies and certainly encourage EU political voluntarism towards the region. But it could also bring about a relative distance between an integrated southern shore on the one side and, on the other, the European Union. This scenario, not very plausible at the end of 2010, has won in probability thanks to the Arab revolutions.
In order for the regional convergence scenario, that IPEMED strongly wishes, to become a reality, 9 recommendations for a Mediterranean “ecosystem” have been set out:
1. Invest in human capital by encouraging mobility (authorise temporary migration for services under contract and projects co-funded by the UfM) and qualifications (create a common base, a Euro-Mediterranean network of vocational training courses and establish recognition-accreditation of skills and diplomas; ErasmusMed, etc.).
2. Accelerate the transfer of knowledge, skills and technology by (i) encouraging the emergence of Euro-Mediterranean competitiveness and research clusters in sectors with high growth or rich in employment (information and communication technologies for services, farming and energy efficiency techniques, etc.); (ii) narrowing down location choices to the region: setting up a system of regional preferences, going beyond free trade, and based on social, health and environmental quality criteria would contribute to accelerating the transfer of capital and know-how.
3. Create a common institutional area accompanied by financial transfers, an advanced status including funds inspired by the philosophy of accession funds to the European domestic market (with the progressive establishment of the four freedoms of movement for goods, capital, services and people), and pursue discussions on accession for EU candidate countries.
4. Engage a Mediterranean certification process, initially covering services and agriculture, with a Mediterranean label guaranteeing health quality (establishment of a health agency) and environmental quality for farming, and skills level and service quality for the provision of services.
5. Select UfM cofounded projects based on job creation potential and/or energy restraint.
6. Create a Mediterranean environment fund aimed at strengthening the capacity to adapt to climate change in South and East Mediterranean countries and the Balkans. It will also finance renewable energy transport’s infrastructure and public transport as an alternative to roads, clean development projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and projects for rationalizing water demand and energy efficiency, particularly in the building sector.
7. Set up a Mediterranean investment bank, based on the same principles as the European Investment Bank, and designed to encourage funding for SMEs, which are key to the creation of wealth and jobs, and infrastructures.
8. Enlarge transport networks in the South Mediterranean to facilitate South-South commercial exchanges, with a particular focus on multimodal transport to better optimize logistical costs.
9. Draw up a common food security policy (mutualized insurance for agricultural risk; constitution of security stocks and emergency intervention systems) and a rural development policy (tangible and intangible infrastructures for industries; managerial and technological training courses).
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2012 : Promotion of the reflection of the “Mediterranean 2030” consortium and the new publication. Launch of two new subjects of reflection : the diversification of the SEMC’s economies (and in particular the service sector) and Turkey and the interest of the supranational regulations.
9 December 2011 : High level debate, in Paris, “The Mediterranean in 2030. Which propositions for better convergence?” and presentation of the reflection of the “Mediterranean 2030” consortium.
September-October 2011: Production of the final report “Tomorrow, the Mediterranean. Scenarios and projections for 2030”.
17 March 2011 : Plenary session in Paris - Political Transition in Arab countries and its impact in the growth scenarios.
9 December 2010 : Meeting on modelling of regional scenarios.
16 and 17 September 2010 : Participation to the European Commission’s expert group meeting in Istanbul... ![]()
2012 : Promotion of the reflection of the “Mediterranean 2030” consortium and the new publication. Launch of two new subjects of reflection : the diversification of the SEMC’s economies (and in particular the service sector) and Turkey and the interest of the supranational regulations.
9 December 2011 : High level debate, in Paris, “The Mediterranean in 2030. Which propositions for better convergence?” and presentation of the reflection of the “Mediterranean 2030” consortium.
September-October 2011: Production of the final report “Tomorrow, the Mediterranean. Scenarios and projections for 2030”.
17 March 2011 : Plenary session in Paris - Political Transition in Arab countries and its impact in the growth scenarios.
9 December 2010 : Meeting on modelling of regional scenarios.
16 and 17 September 2010 : Participation to the European Commission’s expert group meeting in Istanbul “Forward looking on the long term challenges for the Mediterranean area”.
15 August 2010 : Production of the report of the work group “common values in the Mediterranean”.
25 and 26 May 2010 : The Mediterranean Talks “For a common vision of the Mediterranean : strategy, projects and funding” proposed in its opening session a focus on the region’s future.
25 and 26 March 2010 : High-level plenary meeting at the Ministerial Conference Centre in Paris – the regional scenarios.
11 and 12 March 2010 : Participation to the European Commission’s expert group meeting in Rabat “Forward looking on the long term challenges for the Mediterranean area”.
9 March 2010 : Production of mid-term sectorial reports (migration, employment, energy, agriculture).
24 February 2010 : Meeting on common values in the Mediterranean, in Rabat.
17 February 2010 : Technical plenary meeting in Paris - sectorial forecasting (migration, employment, energy, agriculture).
28 January 2010 : Meeting on modelling of regional scenarios in OME’s headquarters.
20 and 21 November 2009 : Seminar on employment in Tunis.
25-27 June 2009 : Working seminar - beginning of the operational phase.
21 April 2009 : Launch meeting - cooperation modalities and methodological discussions.
March – April 2009 : “Mediterranean 2030” report – publication of an initial report, digest and synopsis of the existing data for the Mediterranean, in a coherent format, as a starting point to open debate.
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The Mediterranean region is not only considered by the degree of the interrelations between the neighbouring States and by its interaction with the rest of the world, but also by the main stakes to which it is confronted. From this point of view, it seemed necessary to thematically decline the Mediterranean foresight, knowing that a thematic approach might be difficult to integrate with the global scenarios approach. Within the framework of this project, four transverse themes have been privileged : employment and human capital, mobility and migration, energy and climate change and agriculture and food safety. They have then been integrated in the regional scenarios imagined during the project.
Employment and human capital :
Sector-based foresight piloted by Frédéric Blanc, Delegate general of FEMISE.
The objective of this reflection is, on the one hand, to study the evolution of... ![]()
The Mediterranean region is not only considered by the degree of the interrelations between the neighbouring States and by its interaction with the rest of the world, but also by the main stakes to which it is confronted. From this point of view, it seemed necessary to thematically decline the Mediterranean foresight, knowing that a thematic approach might be difficult to integrate with the global scenarios approach. Within the framework of this project, four transverse themes have been privileged : employment and human capital, mobility and migration, energy and climate change and agriculture and food safety. They have then been integrated in the regional scenarios imagined during the project.
Employment and human capital :
Sector-based foresight piloted by Frédéric Blanc, Delegate general of FEMISE.
The objective of this reflection is, on the one hand, to study the evolution of human capital in the Mediterranean in 2030 by taking into account past evolutions and, on the other hand, to establish quantified projections on employment and unemployment. Initial and lifelong learning as well as their adequacy to the needs of the economy and their participation in a higher potential growth are also analysed. Finally, lessons have been drawn on the evolution of the productivity of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries in 2030.
Population and migration :
Sector-based foresight piloted by Philippe Fargues, Director of CARIM, in association with Hervé Le Bras, EHESS.
The objective of this reflection is, on the one hand, to better known the migratory phenomena in the region, and in particular circular migration, and, on the other hand, to establish quantified projections of migration and mobility in the Mediterranean in 2030, by taking into account demographic constraints, modification of the migratory profiles but also geopolitical uncertainties and changes in migratory policies. The implications of these evolutions on Northern and Southern labour markets as well as on the volume and the affectation of migrants' transfers are also analyzed.
Energy and climate change :
Sector-based prospective piloted by Houda Allal, Director strategy in the OME.
This reflection takes into account the effects of environmental damages (in particular climate change), the economic and demographic growth and the modification of life styles linked to income increase. The OME also attempts to establish quantified projections of production and energy demand in the Mediterranean region in 2030, as well as to identify the implications in terms of security of supplies (related to the international evolution of prices) and its consequences on economic activity, income and employment.
Agriculture and food safety :
Sector-based foresight piloted by Vincent Dollé, Director of IAMM, member of CIHEAM.
The CIHEAM/IAMM leads a reflection on agriculture, food safety and rural development issues in the Mediterranean region by paying a particular attention to climate change and its potential impact on agriculture, health, nutrition and economic development.
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Within the “Mediterranean 2030” project, three workgroups have been created. They have debate about common and shared values in the Mediterranean, on models of regional integration and quantification and modelling of regional scenarios.
Shared values in the Mediterranean :
This workgroup, coordinated by Pierre Beckouche (IPEMED), has published a report (available n this wed site) on the subject on September 2010.
The members of the”Mediterranean 2030” consortium were confronted with the following question: What values should be at the root of Euro-Mediterranean integration? To answer to this delicate junction between economic and cultural approaches, this workgroup was set up. Its first task was to differentiate three distinct notions: the notion of value, a complex notion that should not be limited to religion, nor be expanded to cover a disparate set of behaviour... ![]()
Within the “Mediterranean 2030” project, three workgroups have been created. They have debate about common and shared values in the Mediterranean, on models of regional integration and quantification and modelling of regional scenarios.
Shared values in the Mediterranean :
This workgroup, coordinated by Pierre Beckouche (IPEMED), has published a report (available n this wed site) on the subject on September 2010.
The members of the”Mediterranean 2030” consortium were confronted with the following question: What values should be at the root of Euro-Mediterranean integration? To answer to this delicate junction between economic and cultural approaches, this workgroup was set up. Its first task was to differentiate three distinct notions: the notion of value, a complex notion that should not be limited to religion, nor be expanded to cover a disparate set of behaviour patterns; the notion of “collective preferences” and the notion of “vectors of mobilization”. Identifying the founding values of a common region or the preferences for a draft region is one thing, setting them in motion is another. In twenty years’ time, will there be a value that inhabitants throughout the region will be prepared to get into the streets to defend? This is the main question that has guided this refelction.
Due to the lack of existing forecasting studies on values, the working group’s short-term goal has been to describe the main retrospective developments in individual and collective values in the Mediterranean, based on surveys and studies available, and the identified future collective preferences of the region.
Models of regional integration :
This workgroup is coordinated by Cécile Jolly, analyst (CAS).
After having identified the different existing regional integration models and then analysed the visions of an integrated Mediterranean region that underlie positive scenarios used in thematic forecasts, the working group proposes regional integration scenarios in fact and at law. To do so, it determines which internal and external regional factors are likely to prove decisive. It also analyses potential breakdowns and attempts to trace the courses of the envisaged scenarios (the stages). Lastly, it sets out the sectoral themes relating to the jointly defined global scenarios.
Modelling and integrating sectoral forecasts :
This workgroup has count with the collaboration of Mohamed Ali Marouani (Université de Paris 1).
After making an analysis of existing modellings on the Mediterranean region, the working group would move on to study the technical and institutional feasibility of a regional modelling. This would focus on the possibility of a common database – most likely a regional tool with national contributions – and the construction of a regional input-output table.
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Today, the “Mediterranean 2030” consortium regularly gathers more than 30 institutions from 15 different countries of the Mediterranean basin.
The following organisations are actively associated to this reflection :
Albanian Council on Foreign Relations (Albania)
Arab Reform Initiative
Centre d’Analyse Stratégique (France)
Centre d’Etudes Appliquées et de Prospective (Algeria)
Centre for future studies (Egypt)
Centre for Mediterranean Middle East and Islamic studies – University of Peloponnese (Greece)
Centre Mauritanien d’Analyse des Politiques (Mauritania)
CeSPi, Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (Italy)
Commissariat Général à la Planification et à la Prospective (Algeria)
Euro Mediteranski Forum (EMEF) (Croatia)
École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (France)
Haut Commissariat au Plan (Morocco)
IEMed (Spain)
Institut Royal des Études Stratégiques (Morocco)
Institut Tunisien de la Compétitivité et des Etudes Quantitatives (Tunisia)
Institut Tunisien des Études Stratégiques (ITES) (Tunisia)
Laboratoire d’Economie des Transports (LET) (France)
Ministry of sciences, education and sports (Croatia)
Ministry of foreign affairs and European integration (Croatia)
Observatoire Universitaire de la Réalité Socio-économique (Lebanon)
Planning and Information office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina
« Mauritanie vision 2030 » project (Mauritania)
State Planning Organization (Turkey)
University Mohammed V Rabat-Agdal (Morocco)
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Project manager at the Centre d’Analyse Stratégique.
Cécile Jolly is an analyst in political economy at the Centre d’analyse stratégique (CAS). Prior to this, she worked for the French Ministry of Defence (strategic affairs department) and then the Planning Commission.
She is the author of:
Le partenariat euro-méditerranéen, la dynamique de l’intégration régionale (La Documentation française, 2000)
L’Etat et les ONG : pour un partenariat efficace (La Documentation française, 2002)
L’entreprise responsable (éditions du Félin, 2006).

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